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Abstract: This paper examines some policies pursued in developing countries for the 
provision of telecommunications services in rural areas. These policies significantly differ 
from those typically implemented in developed countries in their fundamental objectives, 
the technological strategies deployed and the market and institutional environments they 
rest on. A review of some representative experiences suggests that thinking about public 
utility reforms in this part of the world is quite a challenging exercise. We point out some 
economic and institutional characteristics of these countries that we believe normative 
analysis of the reforms should explicitly take into account 
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ver the last two decades academic and industry observers of 
network industries development dynamics worldwide have 
witnessed pervasive efforts to construct a normative theoretical 
framework that can provide useful practical guidance for public utility 
reforms 1. The reflection initiated in this paper takes its roots in our 
conviction that, when it comes to developing countries, there is a strong 
need to amend this intellectual corpus so as to account for the specific 
characteristics of their markets and institutions 2. The main goal of this paper 
is to illustrate this point by revisiting some of the prominent questions 
surrounding the concept of universal service that has historically been 
developed in the context of advanced economies. More specifically, we 
                     
(*) We thank A. Chandhuri and two anonymous referees for useful comments. Remaining errors 
are ours. 
1 The literature that has formalized and analyzed issues raised by incentive regulation has 
largely contributed to these efforts. 
2 LAFFONT (2005) is a major step in this direction. 
O
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review some representative developing countries' experiences in the 
definition and implementation of universal access policies with the purpose 
of investigating the impact of the structuring of markets and institutions on 
the performance of these policies. 
It is striking that, despite the importance of the issues involved, the 
literature on universal service specific to developing countries is generally 
thin and has essentially come out of industry and development institutions 
such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World 
Bank. There is clearly a need to bring academic work closer to this rich 
"institutional" literature. As indicated above, however, for this endeavor to 
bear any fruits, it is important that the specific characteristics of developing 
countries be given due attention. The features of these countries' economies 
provide us with enough incentives to explore two directions in which we 
believe that thinking about public utility reforms in the developing world is of 
particular interest. These directions are discussed in turn. 
While the concept of universal service in developed countries defines a 
minimum level of service that individual households must be provided with, 
for developing countries, the notion of universal access, which relates to 
minimum geographical coverage of a community, seems more appropriate. 
An important question is consequently to what extent developing countries 
can, in the short and medium term, afford a solution to universal provision of 
service that rests on network expansion, as is the case in developed 
countries. The fact is that, in developing countries, mechanisms that 
circumvent the poor quality of networks to "link" rural areas are 
mushrooming at an impressive pace. We identify some of the most widely 
used mechanisms, discuss the technologies they depend on and explore 
their economic properties. 
Although they generally subscribe to the idea of liberalizing some 
segments of their public utility sectors, developing countries typically lack 
experience with markets and competition. Hence, these countries face the 
simultaneous challenge of implementing policies aimed at reducing a market 
access gap by introducing new technologies and developing proper market 
mechanisms and institutions aimed at reducing a market efficiency gap. The 
ability of governments to commit to and enforce these policies clearly is 
crucial to the success of public utilities reforms in developing countries. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section highlights the 
differences between universal service and universal access, which mainly 
stem from the relative emphasis put on service provision and coverage in 
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their fundamental objectives. Innovative options used by developing 
countries to address access to basic and more advanced telecomm-
unications services in rural areas are discussed and compared with more 
traditional practices from an economic efficiency standpoint. 
The third section discusses the economies of rural areas in developing 
countries for the purpose of identifying economic factors that hinder 
accessibility, on the one hand, and of assessing the relative performance of 
alternative technologies that have been deployed, on the other. An important 
implication that emerges from this discussion is that there is an urgent need 
to adapt the regulatory framework so as to facilitate the introduction of 
innovative technological solutions to the problem of rural areas coverage. 
The issue of the relationship between telecommunications technologies 
deployment and the efficiency of economic institutions is taken up in the 
following section. We argue that developing countries need to 
simultaneously address the market efficiency gap and the market access 
gap. We also point out that the success of the reforms critically depends on 
these countries governments' ability to commit to and enforce their 
successive stages. We summarize our thoughts and point to some research 
directions that this preliminary investigation calls for in the conclusion. An 
appendix summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of various 
mechanisms for improving access in developing countries. 
  Universal access 
The first significant aspect that deserves particular attention when 
considering public utilities reforms in developing countries relates to the 
content of universal service. While the 1997 World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreement on "Basic Telecommunications Services" identifies a 
minimal set of principles that its members have to follow to implement an 
effective pro-competitive plan for universal service compliance, each country 
is free to define its specific goals in terms of telecommunications provision  3. 
These goals are typically set according to the country's GDP per capita and 
teledensity 4. Current teledensity figures are strikingly extreme, ranging from 
                     
3 This minimal set of principles includes transparency, non-discrimination, competitive neutrality 
and no burdensome application. 
4 Teledensity is defined as the number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants 
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a high of over 40% to 45% in developed countries to a low of 1% to 5% or 
even less in developing countries. The issue assumes even greater 
importance when attempting to predict the evolution of teledensity. For 
countries below the 1% threshold, it is simply impossible to predict the time 
required to reach higher levels (ITU, 1998). Beyond this threshold of 1%, it 
takes on average fifty years to reach a teledensity that reflects some 
reasonably high level of telecommunications development (of around 50%). 
These pronounced differences in teledensity have resulted in two types 
of policies. A first type concerns developed countries, which have been 
mainly upgrading their networks and expanding them to remote regions in 
order to provide service to the homes of the least accessible populations. 
These objectives are part of the so-called universal service policies, which 
emphasize private or individual ownership of telecommunications means of 
access. A second type of policies concerns developing countries that have 
been seeking to install infrastructure in order to provide basic voice 
telephony to the population at large, and often for the very first time 5. Under 
such circumstances, public and shared rather than private 
telecommunications means of access are of greater priority. This has 
resulted in universal access policies that emphasize "covering the territory" 
with means of access to telecommunications services rather than making 
them "available to every home" as stated in the historical objectives of 
universal service (REY, 1984). 
This difference in emphasis has translated into some goals in low-income 
countries that are simply hard to conceive in high-income economies 6.  For 
2010 the ITU has set one public payphone per 1,000 inhabitants and one 
telecenter (Internet connection) for every 50,000 people as an achievable 
universal access goal 7. These goals vary with the size of rural communities, 
ranging from "a thirty-minute traveling distance to a phone" in South Africa to 
"a telephone within less than five kilometers in Brazil", and a "one family, 
one telephone in urban areas and telephone service to every administered 
village in rural areas" in China (NAVAS-SABATER ET AL, 2002). 
                     
5 Currently, three billion people do not have access to basic telecommunications services in the 
developing world. 
6 For a recent review on universal service obligations in developing countries, see CHISARI et 
al (2003), CLARK & WALLSTEN (2002) and ESTACHE et al (2004). 
7 For developed countries, the goal is one payphone per 500 inhabitants. Of a population of 143 
million internet users worldwide, 90% reside in high-income countries while only 1% live in 
Africa. 
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To achieve these targets, developing countries have implemented 
various strategies, all of which share the problems of money collection, 
vandalism and general maintenance associated with traditional telephone 
booths (ANYIMADU et al, 2003).  An initial solution to these problems has 
been proposed through the availability of phone cards. However, as users 
have to buy cards prior to using them, this practice often makes the service 
less affordable. Moreover, this solution requires users to place their calls 
themselves which assumes some level of education that the population does 
not always possess. 
An alternative solution is through the use of "village phones", i.e., pay 
phones for community use which are operated by households for profit 8.  
While this strategy of offering basic telephone service has been widely used, 
it has had only a limited impact on rural areas to-date. In Bangladesh where 
about 1,100 village mobile payphones have been franchised to private 
operators or households under a risk-sharing program, there are still almost 
60,000 villages without telephone services. Similar situations prevail in India, 
South Africa, and Morocco where only one third of the over 6,000 
payphones available throughout the country are in rural areas (InfoDev(3), 
2000).  
Alternative options with a wider range of services offered exist, most 
notably Multipurpose Community Telecenters (MTC) and Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) cooperatives 9. In Brazil and Vietnam, 
MCT projects have been launched, but mainly in large cities. In India, 
Uganda, and Surinam, "regional information centers" that offer telematic 
services have been created in rural areas. In Bolivia and Poland, ICT based 
on community-owned networks provide connections to areas that otherwise 
would not be served. Although their ownership/management structure is still 
subject to some debate, there seems to be a consensus around a private 
business conception of telecenters combined with a public funding 
mechanism of the start-up costs (WELLENIUS, 2003). 
Theres are notable differences between the universal service obligations 
(USO) and universal access obligations (UAO) that operators have to 
                     
8 Village telephones have been used in Bangladesh, India, Morocco, South Africa, Peru, among 
other places. 
9 The services offered typically include telephony, fax, e-mail, internet access, and printing and 
photocopying capabilities. Public services, such as tele-education, tele-health care and 
government/community-on line services have also been offered together with some postal, 
banking, and Small and Medium-Sized Entreprises (SMEs) support services. 
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comply with. In developed countries, USOs define the content of the 
"basket" of services to be offered to individual households. In the United 
States, the 1996 Telecommunications Act defines the set of USO services to 
include access to services that clearly go beyond basic telephony 10. 
Moreover, the Federal Communications Commision has explicitly recognized 
the need to periodically update USOs to reflect advances in 
telecommunications and information technologies advances. This same 
approach based on an evolving level of services that are to be offered by 
operators under USO has been followed by the European Union 11.  
The situation is quite different in developing countries where the UAO 
sets standards of geographical coverage. In Peru, the Organismo Supervisor 
de Inversión Privada de Telecomunicaciones (OSIPTEL) has specified three 
goals. These goals are public payphones in rural villages with under 3,000 
inhabitants (5,000 villages with a total of 3.9 million inhabitants) and in 
localities with insufficient service (1,600 localities representing a total 
population of 1.8 million inhabitants), and Internet access in all of the 
country's district capitals (911 of them with a total population of 1.5 million 
inhabitants) (FITEL, 1996). In Chile, 6,000 rural localities with a total 
population of 2.2 million inhabitants were provided first-time community 
telephone service between 1995 and 2000 (WELLENIUS, 2002). In Botswana, 
the government has adopted a Rural Telecommunications Program with the 
objective of providing telephony to all villages with 500+ inhabitants 12. 
Other countries including Cuba, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Iran, Kenya, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maldives, Mozambique, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Thailand, Togo, and Zambia have launched similar programs 
that make rural territory coverage a high priority. The extent to which these 
programs take into account the specific economic characteristics of rural 
areas will clearly determine their success. 
                     
10 This set includes access to a telephone network with the ability to place and receive calls, 
access to touch tone capability, single-party service, access to emergency systems including, 
where available, 911 and enhanced 911, access to operator services, access to inter-exchange 
services, access to directory assistance, and access to limited long distance calling for those 
low-income users who qualify. 
11 In its most recent version of the Voice Directive, the EU included advanced services such as 
voice telephony with fax and modem capabilities, operator assistance, emergency, and 
directory inquiry services. 
12 Under this program, 160,000 access lines are to be installed by Botswana 
Telecommunications Corporation (BTC) and 500 public phones by each mobile operator 
(NAVAS-SABATER et al, 2002). 
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  Technology deployment in rural areas 
Rural areas in developing countries have some economic characteristics 
that make it difficult to provide telecommunications services of an acceptable 
quality at affordable prices without generating losses for operators. Chief 
among these services are low disposable income and high cost per line for 
both fixed and wireless technologies in these areas. While worldwide 
consumers spend on average 2% to 3% of their disposable income on 
telecommunications services, the range is 1% to 5% in countries with low 
levels of GDP per capita (ITU, 2002). As aggregate income tends to be lower 
in rural areas than in urban areas, revenue per subscriber might not support 
network expansion 13. A possible solution to this "ineffective" demand 
problem is to make subscribers jointly contribute to marginal cost as done in 
universal access plans that have users share access devices. 
Two main reasons explain the high cost of network installation and 
maintenance in rural areas of developing countries. A first reason, which 
also applies to developed countries, is that there are typically weak 
economies of density in these areas.  
A second reason is the poor quality or lack of infrastructure required to 
install and maintain telecommunications networks. Rural transportation 
networks are often small and not well maintained in developing countries. In 
fact, many rural communities may not be accessible at all by road 
andtechnical staff on site is rare, making maintenance interventions costly. 
Moreover, some rural areas are not connected to national power grids, and 
hence operators have to supply their own energy. This is clearly onerous for 
the operator as, in addition to the cost of purchasing and installing the power 
system, it is also responsible for the lifetime maintenance costs of the 
system. The incentives for an operator to use telecommunications access 
devices with minimal power requirements and compatibility with renewable 
energy resources such as solar energy are high 14. In the case of cellular 
technologies and Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT), lack of appropriate 
                     
13 Despite the fact that rural subscribers usually have higher consumer surplus per call, the 
total consumer surplus may be below marginal cost of network expansion. 
14 An end-user terminal's energy can be supplied with a solar panel that produces about 75 DC 
watts in full sun, costs about USD 300 to USD 400, and has a lifetime of 20 years. For larger 
power requirements, hybrid power systems that combine both renewable energies and fossil 
fuel may be used. Those systems provide 1.5 kwatts at a cost that ranges from USD 215,000 to 
USD 470,000 (ITU, 2000). 
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infrastructure has been estimated to double or even triple the cost of 
providing this service in rural areas 15.  
The generalization of wireless technologies has speeded up the 
progression of universal accessibility, especially in low density rural areas 
where the incremental cost of wired access lines is quite high. Besides 
density, distance to the telephone exchange network is the other important 
factor. Wireless systems offer lower costs than wired systems beyond about 
a 5 km radius from the exchange network 16.  Other advantages of wireless 
over wired technologies include the relatively low fixed costs, short 
deployment time and a lower network exposure to vandalism. The number of 
subscribers to cellular systems is growing in developing countries twice as 
fast as in developed countries. Over the past five years, sub-saharian 
countries have experienced the fastest growth with annual rates of up to 
150% per year. 
Other technologies including Wireless Local Loop (WLL), VSAT, and 
Multiple Access Systems, applied as stand-alone technologies or combined, 
are also enabling a large number of countries to connect their rural areas. 
The cost of VSAT can be as low as USD 3,000 to USD 4,000 to provide two 
or three village telephones and fax lines, but may vary significantly 
depending on available infrastructure. When combining VSAT with WLL, 
distant rural communities with up to 50 subscribers can be served at a cost 
of USD 1,000 per line, with coverage that ranges up to 100 km (DYMOND et 
al, 1997). Countries that have made large investments in VSAT technologies 
include Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Karakhstan, Peru, South 
Africa and Thailand. In fact, wireless offers are continuously evolving and 
one can expect new niche markets to be reached in the near future. 
Given that in most of the rural areas where these wireless technologies 
apply wired service was not affordable or even not available, neither the 
capacity nor the quality of these wireless technologies seems to be a 
problem, at least in the short run. If one considers state-of-the-art 
technology, while still lagging behind, wireless capacity with data rates up to 
70 Mbps is becoming increasingly competitive with respect to wireline 
                     
15 These estimations account for those cases where there is a need for repeaters, towers for 
antennas and power systems (NAVAS-SABATER et al, 2002). 
16 With cellular systems, the cost per radio connection can range from USD 500 to USD 1500, 
but depends very much on the cell density and on the available infrastructure. Coverage can 
extend to 40 km radius (DYMOND & KAYANI, 1997). 
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possibilities 17. The comparison is even more pertinent for developing 
countries where analogue wireless systems are typically used as second-
best solutions. This is not to say, however, that wireless technologies are 
exempt from problems, indeed quality is one of them. In mobile systems, 
quality is affected by traffic, coverage and fidelity indicators, while in satellite 
systems the availability of the signal depends on interference noise and 
atmospheric and rain absorption, among other factors. 
For both terrestrial and satellite technologies, lower frequencies are 
better suited than higher frequencies in rural areas 18. For example, GSM 
400 stations cover the same area as GSM 1800 and GSM 900 with, 
respectively, a fifth and a half of the number of sites, a typical cell in the 400 
MHz band covering a territory within a 40 km radius when using 2-watt 
mobiles 19. For satellite, the 1 GHz frequency dominates higher frequencies 
in terms of the cost/coverage ratio (ITU, 2000). It is worth noting that the 
quality of the signal is completely independent of the frequency range as the 
latter does not affect the assigned bandwidth. 
Since bandwidth is assigned to different services by the regulator, in fine, 
it is therefore the latter who determines quality. In response to service 
providers' lack of sufficient data to estimate demand in rural areas, flexible 
systems allowing the network to be built out as needed at the lowest 
incremental cost are available. An example is provided by scalable radio 
networks that allow for capacity to be modified from a few hundred to a few 
thousands users without substantially affecting hardware and software 
configurations. 
In order to reduce the economic impact of inadequate maintenance and 
low computer literacy in rural areas, developing countries have been 
favoring simplified access device configuration and operation 20. Other 
                     
17 A recent wireless technology, World Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), 
promises 70 Mbps in a 48-Km radius. With geostationary (GEO) and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
satellites a capacity up to 1 Gbps can be attained but this requires the use of all the bandwidth 
of the satellite. Thus, financial constraints typically limit capacities to much lower rates. As 
impressive as they can be, these figures are far below the possibilities offered by wire 
connections with 500 Mbps for coaxial cables and 1000 Gbps for fiber cable. 
18 Higher frequencies are more appropriate in urban areas. 
19 Similar comparisons can be made between Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 450 MHz 
and higher. 
20 Computer resource managers involved in a UNESCO pilot project in Zimbabwe identified PC 
hardware configuration as the most difficult task they faced due to the absence of local 
expertise (ITU, 2000). 
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strategies that affect costs such as remote network management and long 
life cycles are also considered in rural areas. To the extent that systems can 
be controlled from centralized facilities allowing for economies of scope, the 
number of physical trips to the installation sites is reduced and thus, the life 
time operation and maintenance costs are minimized. Moreover, as 
equipment in rural areas cannot sustain rapid turnover, it is chosen under 
the constraint that repairing services and spare parts cannot be provided for 
long periods of time. 
As the above review shows, the economics of rural areas in developing 
countries is the driving force behind the proliferation of technological 
solutions to the problem of access to telecommunications services in those 
areas. To what extent this process is going to respond to the fundamental 
goals of universal access will critically depend on the adequacy of the 
markets and regulatory institutions that these countries have put in place to 
accompany this process of innovation in the use of telecommunications 
technologies. 
  Markets and institutions 
Two broad policies have been identified by The World Bank as policies 
that should be pursued in order to achieve universal access (NAVAS-
SABATER et al, 2002).  The first policy is the so-called "market efficiency gap" 
reduction strategy which aims to minimise the difference between what the 
markets currently achieve and what they would be able to achieve if entry 
barriers were removed. Thus, this strategy does not require "direct" 
government intervention and concerns activities that can be deployed under 
suitable liberalization measures. These activities can be thought of as 
constituting the commercially viable part of universal access 21. The second 
policy is the "market access gap" reduction strategy, which aims to minimize 
the number of people that remain beyond the limits of what markets would 
normally serve. Under this strategy, direct government intervention is 
necessary to deploy some activities that otherwise wouldn't be offered by the 
                     
21 It should be recognized that the assessment of commercial viability may still be a tough task 
in developing countries. In particular, waiting lists can be misleading due to artificially low prices 
and unexpressed demand. 
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market. Hence, such activities can be regarded as falling into the non-
commercially viable part of universal access 22. 
Commercially viable universal access 
When attempting to reduce their market efficiency gap, developing 
countries are often restricted to a limited set of measures, mainly due to the 
lack of government commitment and the difficulties in creating independent 
regulatory bodies 23. The typical measures used are the rebalancing of 
tariffs, the privatization of the incumbent and the introduction of competition 
coupled with regulation. It is probably too early to assess the real impact of 
these measures on the telecommunications industry, but examining some 
experiences, particularly those of some pioneering Latin American countries, 
is very informative. 
Available data seems to suggest a positive correlation between tariff 
rebalancing and network expansion, as reflected in access demand. The 
current situation in developing countries is such that low penetration is often 
not so much a problem of prices that are not affordable, but rather prices 
that are set too low to give operators incentives to meet demand. Using data 
on a panel of 23 Latin American countries from 1986 to 1995, BANERJEE et 
al (2000) find that a 10% increase in the average residential price reduces 
unsatisfied demand by approximately 4.1%. Increases in the percentage of 
households equipped with telecommunications access devices following 
tariff rebalancing plans were also observed in Malaysia, Hungary, Morocco, 
and Uruguay during the 1990s. 
Due to a structurally constrained supply in developing countries, 
privatization of the incumbent can also be expected to enhance network 
expansion 24. Higher prices allowed by tariff rebalancing initiatives, which 
typically precede privatization plans, and availability of private capital gives 
the operator incentives to expand its market. After controlling for tariff 
rebalancing, BANERJEE et al (2000) find that privatizing reduces unmet 
                     
22 Note that even if barriers are removed, the boundaries between these two gaps are 
expected to change due to technological progress among others. 
23 Lack of human and financial resources has also been a typical problem facing developing 
countries. 
24 For a recent review of international experiences with privatization, see BORTOLOTTI & 
SINISCALCO (2004). 
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demand by approximately 28%. A similar result is found by GUTIERREZ 
(2003) in 22 Latin American countries during the period 1980-1997, with a 
reduction of unmet demand of around 10-18%. 
The success of privatization programs depends heavily on the extent to 
which governments commit not to expropriate the property of assets that are 
largely sunk and not to interfere with the regulatory process. In Ghana, the 
government unilaterally abrogated a 1996 management contract over the 
privatized incumbent Ghana Telecom (GT) preventing Telecom Malaysia 
from holding a majority of the board and refusing to sell an additional 15% of 
GT, while the Ministry of Communications exerted influence on the 
regulatory agency (HAGGARTY et al, 2002). In the Philippines, during the 
1970s and 1980s the privatization process and the regulatory reforms lead 
to quite negative outcomes. Although disputes were taken to court, the 
regulatory rules had not been explicitly stated, the enforcing agencies had 
no clear mandates and the judiciary system was weakened by the influence 
of the president. This resulted in a decrease in the network expansion rate 
during these periods. By contrast, in Chile where the commitment problems 
had been resolved, networks expanded substantially (GALAL et al, 2002). 
The impact of privatization on efficiency is also affected by the degree to 
which the regulator is independent. Indeed, while BANERJEE et al (2000) and 
GUTIERREZ (2003) find that privatization has increased labour efficiency in 
Latin American countries, a negative relationship is found by WALLSTEN 
(2001) in data on thirty African and Latin American countries covering the 
period 1984-1997, where efficiency is measured in terms of connection 
capacity and main lines per employee. When regulatory independence is 
called for, WALLSTEN (2001) reverses this relationship between privatization 
and efficiency. GUTIERREZ (2003) also finds that in countries where 
government interference was restrained, labor efficiency increased. 
BAUDRIER (2001) provides an attempt to measure the effects of hold up 
problems by directly analyzing the impact of regulatory independence on 
basic telecommunications infrastructure, but the results are not 
conclusive 25.  
Although by 1999 about 73% of basic telecommunications services were 
still under monopoly provision, significant liberalization of the industry had 
                     
25 Note, however, that the creation of an independent regulatory body may not be such an easy 
task even in relatively well governed and not particularly poor countries such as Botswana. A 
shortage of skilled people might be an obstacle to the separation of politics and economic 
regulation (STERN, 2000). 
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occurred in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia (InfoDev(1), 
2000).  Empirical studies indicate that the introduction of competition in 
developing countries has resulted in greater efficiency and network 
expansion 26. Two effects of liberalization are worth noting. Firstly, 
liberalization measures may destroy traditional cross-subsidy mechanisms 
that can be used to expand networks to high cost areas. Secondly, while 
(yardstick) competition is expected to decrease firms' rents due to 
asymmetric information on technology, in the case of developing countries, it 
is not so clear that the regulator will be able to bridge the informational gap. 
Another aspect concerning market liberalization is the need to regulate 
(equal) access in order to prevent favoritism and promote effective 
competition. This clearly depends on the capacity of the regulator to enforce 
access rules and tariffs. In Ghana, the incumbent firm GT had little incentive 
to ease interconnection for other operators. As a result, in 2001, after three 
years of operation, the second network operator Westel had only about 
2.600 subscribers and the mobile operator Mobitel claimed that applied 
interconnection charges could force it to exit the market (HAGGARTY et al, 
2002). 
Just as with privatization, the process of liberalization can be 
substantially affected by government commitment and interference 27. For 
example, in Senegal, a second cellular license was issued in the 199Os to 
Sentela, a subsidiary of the U.S. company Millicom International. However, 
when a new government took over in 2000, the price paid by Sentel was 
considered too low and the license was unilaterally withdrawn without any 
renegotiation. The creation of the regulatory agency had been deliberately 
delayed and the "Direction de la Réglementation" that was acting as a 
regulator had no effective power (AZAM et al, 2002). 
Concessions have also been used as an alternative mechanism to 
licenses sales that, while allowing for ex ante competition, circumvent the 
transfer of property rights to private investors 28. These concession 
contracts between the government or the incumbent (public) operator and 
                     
26 See FINK et al (2002) for a study of a panel data on 86 developing countries across Africa, 
Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean over the period 1985-1999. Wallsten 
(2001) and Gutierrez (2003) focus on the experiences of a set of African and Latin American 
countries while Ross (1999) examines countries with GDP per capita less than $10.000. 
27 For an empirical exploration of the relationship between institutional quality and access to 
telecommunications infrastructure, see HORRALL (2002). 
28 In some cases, transfer of property rights to private investors is prohibited by law. 
32   No. 58, 2nd Q. 2005 
private investors have taken various forms, including Built-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT), Built-Transfer-Operate (BTO), and Built-Operate-Own (BOO) 
arrangements, among others 29. In some cases, investors do not build or 
own facilities, but just share revenues with the incumbent public operator in 
return for providing financing (China and Indonesia) or management 
(Vietnam) (InfoDev(3), 2000). While BOT and BTO risk-revenue sharing 
agreements initially met with relative success, they currently seem to be 
posing incentive problems 30.  In Thailand, during the 1980s and 1990s, 
thirty concessions were granted to private investors and between 1990 and 
1995 this country had higher network expansion than average in South East 
Asia. Currently, the trend is towards below average. The situation is similar 
in Lebanon and Indonesia. 
Non-commercially viable universal access 
Policies that are implemented by developing countries to reduce their 
market access gap are to some extent of the same type as those used in 
developed countries. However, as discussed before, developing countries 
have focused on territory coverage and community, rather than individual 
household access to service. This difference in emphasis, as well as the 
specific characteristics of rural economies in developing countries, has been 
reflected in the types of technologies deployed 31. Markets and regulatory 
institutions have a major role to play in the deployment of these innovative 
access technologies, even in a priori non profitable territories. 
In Botswana, the introduction of two private mobile operators since 1998 
has allowed populations in remote and low density areas to access 
telecommunications services via multiple access radio and VSAT 
technologies. In 1998, the public operator contracted a firm to build the 
infrastructure needed for fixed line voice messaging through a virtual 
telephony system 32. In Ghana, a rural license was issued in 1994 to Capital 
Telecom which provided 10.000 lines using WLL technology in 1997. In 
                     
29 BTO schemes have been used in Thailand and Philippines, BOT in Lebanon, India, and 
Indonesia, and BOO in Malaysia and Solomon Islands. 
30 The nature of these problems depends on the specific context, but the operator may use its 
bargaining power to choose the most profitable consumers, among other things. 
31 See above. 
32 Virtual telephony allows a subscriber to have a telephone number and a voice mailbox 
enabling him to receive messages and access them from any phone. 
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Uganda, privatization of the incumbent operator ended in 2000 with a 
development plan that included the provision of cellular and WLL services, 
and the deployment of teleshops and multipurpose community centers to 
meet increasing demand. 
Binding financial resources and weak accountability militate for keeping 
minimal regulatory intervention. However, the use of regulatory procedures 
can positively affect the rate of deployment of innovative access 
technologies 33. The radio spectrum allocation and assignment procedures 
often need to be redefined so as to allow for innovative offers that use 
wireless technologies. Proactive regulation speeds up deployment and 
reduces technical coordination problems that may arise among spectrum 
users 34. India and Indonesia are among the developing countries that have 
followed a proactive approach to the allocation of spectrum in order to 
stimulate innovation. Coordination of standards among operators is also an 
important issue in developing countries, where particularly diversified access 
technologies are expected to proliferate 35.  
Unbundling of the incumbent's network elements is also a factor that 
enhances the technological feasibility and economic viability of offers based 
on cellular and satellite mobile communications technologies 36. In Mexico, 
specific interconnection regulatory rules have facilitated the operations of 
cellular and value added services operators. In India, regulation was issued 
in 1999 that states that no service provider would be charged for any 
interconnection facility it does not require. This has enabled entrants to 
combine new technologies with existing networks. Unbundled access to the 
local loop has been mandated in other low-income countries such as 
Albania, Guatemala, Kyrgistan, and Pakistan. 
Providing access to telecommunications services in rural areas comes at 
a high social cost anywhere, let alone in low-income countries. These costs 
are typically financed with public funds collected through taxation or with 
                     
33 Useful reviews of regulatory measures that enhance innovation are TYLER (1993), 
InfoDev.a (2000), Info Dev.b (2000), and ITU (2000). 
34 Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) and WiMAX wireless technologies allow the use of unlicensed 
frequency bands which may have a positive impact on rural areas given that technical problems 
due to interference are likely to be small due to the presence of a limited number of competitors. 
35 Standardization creates a tradeoff between the benefits of competition in equipment supply 
and network externalities and the disadvantages of inertia in innovation. 
36 Note that unbundling reduces the incentives for facility-based entry and hence may 
negatively affect network expansion. 
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financial obligations imposed on operators. The most commonly adopted 
financial mechanisms are the Universal Service Fund (USF) and the 
mandatory UAO 37. The relative merits of these two types of mechanisms in 
the context of developing countries are still subject to investigation. In 
particular, given the specific characteristics of these countries, one wonders 
whether or not restoring some traditional mechanisms, such as the historical 
cross-subsidies that have practically disappeared in developed economies, 
is desirable. 
An increasing number of developing countries have set USFs (Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Nepal, and Peru) or are in their planning phase (Bolivia, Egypt, and 
Uganda) 38. In some of these countries, taxing operators' revenues does not 
guarantee sufficient funds to cover the cost of network expansion 39. For 
example, for a country like Nepal which has an extremely low teledensity of 
1.15, it would take about 109 years to finance a USD 124 million universal 
access cost with a tax rate of 1% on operators' revenues (NAVAS-SABATER 
et al, 2002). Another problem that USFs face in developing countries is that 
once the funds are collected, the risk that they be diverted to other public 
expenditures or even privately used is high. In Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, 
funds for rural development have been planned, but have experienced 
problems in getting operational. 
Auctions have also been used to determine universal access subsidies to 
be granted to operators, but their outcome is uncertain in developing 
countries where lack of competitive bidding and expertise are exacerbated 
40.  The adverse effects of the lack of competition are sometimes alleviated 
by twinning profitable and unprofitable areas in simultaneous multiple round 
auctions. In Ghana, Capital Telecom was the only bidder for providing 
services to rural areas in the south of the country and has only installed one 
site with a few hundred customers (HAGGARTY et al, 2002). Lack of expertise 
has induced exceesively loose screening rules and bidding criteria. 
Experiences in Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru have shown that 
winners are often in partnership with, or owned by, equipment suppliers that 
                     
37 UAO stands for universal access obligations. 
38 A particularly interesting experience is that of Malaysia where the fund compensates 
operators based on their investments in uneconomic areas (NAVAS-SABATER et al, 2002). 
39 Other sources of funding are license fees (Guatemala and Colombia) and government 
(Chile). Revenues from emerging data services could also partly relieve financial constraints. 
40 Nett (1998) offers a useful review of universal service auctions. 
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do not always have the necessary customer service and marketing 
experience. Moreover, in some cases (Chile and Peru), economic 
uncertainty and a lack of expertise have resulted in such aggressive bidding 
that the (very low) subsidies turned out to have no significant impact on the 
operator's obligations 41.  
Mandatory universal access obligation schemes constitute the other 
significant technique used to finance universal access. Service provision 
target levels are typically imposed on newly privatized or licensed operators. 
Satisfactory results can be expected if certain important conditions are met. 
Firstly and most importantly, the government's ability to enforce these 
obligations through the legal and judicial system is critical. In India, by 2004, 
the six operators that were issued licenses in 1997 and 1998 covered only 
13% (12.655 villages) of the area they had committed to (BORGOHAIN et al, 
2004).  Although licenses agreements were subject to cancellation in case of 
non compliance with the commitments, operators have only been made to 
pay fines for the delay. 
A second important point concerning UAO relates to the burden these 
obligations are likely to impose on operators. Too harsh an obligation may 
just not be feasible. In Malaysia, the incumbent has officially made a request 
to share its obligation to reach a teledensity of 50% with four other 
operators. If the costs of serving uneconomic areas are passed on to 
subscribers, resulting prices may no longer be affordable. In some cases, 
"exclusivity periods" have been granted to the operators that are under UAO. 
Clearly, the drawback of this practice is that it severely limits competition 
during these periods 42. Argentina, Botswana, Chile, Malaysia, Peru, 
Singapore, and Venezuela are among the countries that have suffered from 
the adverse effects of this type of plan (GUTIERREZ, 1999). To alleviate these 
effects a little, some countries such as Malaysia and Singapore have used 
renegotiation to introduce competition at an earlier stage for financial 
compensation. 
A third concern is that lack of experience and expertise might lead to the 
specification of targets that are not legally enforceable ex post. In the 
Philippines, roll out targets did not specify the areas to be covered resulting 
in a failure to achieve the government's objective of one rural line for ten 
                     
41 Chile has since changed its bidding criteria, in particular, by requiring that bidders specify a 
delivery time together with the subsidy bid. 
42 WALLSTEN (2000) finds that such a practice may lead to a reduction in mainline growth 
rates of up to 40%. 
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urban lines. In India, some operators have fulfilled the requirement of 10% 
rural network development by just technically covering the outskirts of cities 
where inhabitants of villages can still use the service, but at high charges 
(BORGOHAIN et al, 2004).  Lack of expertise may also result in a serious 
mismatch between targets and expected demand. In the Philippines, 
because lines were installed either where households did not want them or 
couldn't afford them, only 44% of lines installed were actually used. In 
Uganda, unused lines more than doubled the waiting list in 1999. In Bolivia, 
operators were obliged to install a given percentage of the lines that are 
actually demanded. 
  Conclusion 
In their general thrust, the arguments that support public utility reforms in 
developing and developed countries are similar and those conducted in the 
telecommunications industry throughout the world provide a good illustration. 
However, the actual policies designed to carry these reforms are far from 
similar. In the case of policies aimed at expanding service to rural areas, our 
examination of some representative experiences has shown that they differ 
markedly from those implemented in developed countries in their 
fundamental objectives, the technological strategies they rest on, and the 
market organizations and regulatory institutions created to accompany these 
policies. 
The objectives of territory coverage rather than household service 
penetration, on the one hand, and community rather than individual access, 
on the other hand, are both realistic and necessary for developing countries 
which, although severely constrained by financial resources, are conscious 
of the need to bring their rural populations the benefits of new information 
and communication technologies. These broad objectives have translated 
into some technology deployment strategies reflecting the specific 
characteristics of the developing countries' rural areas. Indeed, the 
economics of these areas has prompted the proliferation of highly innovative 
and diversified access technologies, which can provide substantial social 
benefits and opportunities. For this process of innovation to be sustained 
and efficient, however, the development of proper market and regulatory 
institutions seems crucial. 
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Government authorities are bound to play a major role, which is twofold. 
A first step of great importance consists in removing any barriers to the 
supply of activities that are deemed profitable. Relatedly, regulatory rules 
need to be given great flexibility in order to allow for technological 
diversification and hence to help relaxing operators' profitability constraint. 
An unavoidable second step for the government is to directly intervene so 
that activities, that are not economically viable from a private incentives 
perspective, but desirable from a collective standpoint, are supplied. Funds 
dedicated to the financing of these activities (USFs) and obligations imposed 
on operators to engage in them (USO) are the typical mechanisms used by 
governments to make this supply happen. However, the degree to which 
developing countries are able to use these policy instruments for the benefit 
of the largest parts of their populations critically depends on their capacity to 
circumvent the inefficiency of their financial systems and the weak ability of 
their governments to commit to and enforce announced policies. 
Normative regulatory economics provides us with a powerful theoretical 
framework for analyzing many of the questions that arise in developing 
countries embarked on major reforms of their public utilities. Particularly 
important in the case at hand is its contribution to our understanding of the 
incentives to deploy new low-cost technologies in terms of spectrum 
allocation, interconnection agreements and compatibility between standards. 
Moreover, it allowed us to highlight the critical role of independent regulatory 
bodies and regulatory expertise in mitigating the common market failures 
encountered in these countries. 
This overview of some experiences has convinced us of the pertinence of 
the approach, but also of the need to explicitly incorporate some of the 
fundamental specific characteristics of these countries. Reforms such as the 
use of price caps, interconnection agreements, cost allocation mechanisms, 
expansionary targets among others need to be addressed in terms of their 
impact on infrastructure and affordability under the institutional and financial 
constraints discussed in this paper. A developing-country-approach to 
regulatory reforms is expected to see the light of day and empirical work on 
these countries seems both necessary and promising. 
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Appendix 
Mechanisms to improve access in developing countries 
Market efficiency 
gap mechanisms 
Disavantages Advantages 
Tariff rebalancing - Increases residential and rural prices - Reduces unmet demand 
Privatization - Lack of commitment  
- Lack of independent regulator 
- Reduces unmet demand 
Competition - Lack of commitment  
- Lack of interconnection agreements  
- Incompatible standards 
- Need for spectrum allocation 
- Reduces unmet demand 
- Introduces low-cost 
technologies 
BOT/BTO  - Distorts incentives - Encourages capital and 
managerial skills 
Market access gap 
mechanisms 
  
Universal Service 
Funds  
- Lack of financial resources and high cost 
of public funds 
- Lack of expertise in calculating and 
allocating subsidies  
- Bad governance  
- Uncertain outcomes with auctions 
- Targeted  
- Addresses ineffective 
demand 
Mandatory Service 
Obligations 
- Imposes burden  
- Lack of expertise in specifying targets  
- Lack of enforcement  
- Used sometimes to limit competition and 
tariff rebalancing 
- Addresses effective demand 
- More effective when lumping 
low- and high- cost areas, and 
with technology neutral targets 
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